In this work, I argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the devastating civil war that followed was a period of history that defies encapsulation within binaries of “good” and “evil”. This work examines conflicting historical representations of Ahmad Shah Massoud and his role in these two destructive wars. It aims to demystify the image of a warlord.
Why should “they” hate “us”? The very question is on its face absurd, delusional, revealing of an aggregate detachment from reality so virulent in its evasiveness as to be deemed clinically pathological. Setting aside the wholly-contrived “confusion” professed in the aftermath as to who might be properly included under the headings “we” and “they,” the sole legitimate query that might have been posed on 9-1-1 was—and remains—“How could ‘they’ possibly not hate ‘us’?"
Through the use of memoirs and testimonies by Algerian militants and torture survivors, this paper argues that violence by French settlers and military personnel was not only a product of racial and economic power, but also, a result of secular doctrines, which recasted everyday Islamic practices of veiling, ritual purification, and other forms of worship as sites of antagonism.
In our so-called “post-ideological” world, even the most sincere observers have fallen trap to a myth perpetuated by the liberal order: that strategic political action or realpolitik transcends (or is devoid of) ideology. A case in point is the Tunisian Nahda movement’s decision to separate its political activities (primarily its political party) and its da’wah based activities. In 2016 the Nahda movement announced its shift from an “ideological movement engaged in the struggle for identity, to a protest movement against the authoritarian regime, and now to a national democratic party."
Using the Prophet’s mantle as a case study can shed light on the ways in which Islamic relic veneration encompasses a number of paradoxical relationships, namely the connection between the inaccessible and accessible. As an object at the crossroads of different disciplines and art forms, the Holy Mantle has a far-reaching impact that reveals much about the efficacy of such relics in reaching Muslims globally, especially when they have been translated across verbal channels.
In order to accomplish the mission of the “People’s War on Terror,” the Party Secretary of the university Zhou Xuyong declared that all “static” (zaoyin) and “noise” (zayin) would need to be eliminated. Anyone who demonstrated the slightest resonance with unapproved Islamic ideologies was to be purified through a process of “reverse osmosis” (fan shentou). He said the goal was to create an atmosphere in which Uyghur Islamic “extremists” scurried across the street like rats while the public surrounded them screaming their disapproval and beating them in righteous anger.
In the rest of this essay, we examine the consequences of the May 2013 massacre in Dhaka, Bangladesh. We collected written memories, reflections, poems, novellas, videos, other literary and non-literary artifacts in the aftermath of the massacre. These are some of the forms in which the massacre is memorialized within the Islamist counterpublic. These materials are the remaining traces — like dried blood — of the actual sets of events. It is a living archive that not only allows an immanent embodied critique of a secular society, but provides a marginal possibility for a realist speculation in retrospect.
Malcolm’s leave to the Hajj is vital. A series of circumstantial instances placed him within a worldly, proximal corporeality, a rich hapticality of the flesh, with an illuminated, emphatic sense of fungibility more external than what reciprocity could provide. Where reciprocity, the vehicle for recognition, is, to its own freely detestable demise, non-exchangeable, the one who lives for recognition nullifies, in the end, from the start, the capacity to attain a freedom independent of the body. He frequents the times he was met with unconditional hospitality and appreciation on behalf of Muslims across complexion and convention.
Syria's brutal repression of mass demonstrations across Syria in 2011 marked a decisive model of how authoritarian Arab regimes could avoid the fate of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt (and later, Gaddafi in Libya), who were seemingly swept away by popular revolutions, led by a coalition of leftist youth, liberal, constitutionalist reformers, and moderate, democratic Islamists, such as Ennadha and the Muslim Brothers. Bashar al-Assad and his 'Alawi generals and security officials were determined to eradicate the possibility of mass popular participation in political life, which would have made Baathist and 'Alawi control of the Syrian state and economy impossible.