“Though Khashoggi was very much a pillar of the system and royal court, at most a reformist or ‘unreconstructed democrat,’ MBS still had plenty of motivations to eliminate him…the brand of ‘political Islam’ he favored and championed was a cross between those of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—namely, MBS’ top three bêtes noires, since they represent the opposite model (within Islam) of the boy King’s own rule.”
"It is no exaggeration to say that in today’s French mainstream mediascape, Erdoğan is increasingly replacing former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or even Saddam Hussein as “Foreign Islamist Public Enemy Number One.” He has become a dangerous scare-and-hate figure, l’homme à abattre as the French expression goes (“the man to shoot down”), or at best “The Scary Muslim We Love to Hate.” In other words, he is indeed the geopolitical equivalent of a Tariq Ramadan, and one observes that his fate and treatment in French media is more or less the same."
"To our knowledge, no other high-profile personality accused of rape during that same time frame, including most notably President Macron's two ministers Gérard Darmanin and Nicolas Hulot, has been placed in preventive detention while innocent until proven guilty. Ramadan remains the only one. This strongly suggests that the rape accusations were just a pretext to silence and eliminate him, as France’s media and politicians had been trying to do for a good fifteen years already, without success. The obvious double standard, easily visible in every aspect and at every stage of this affair, therefore suggests that Tariq Ramadan is indeed a political prisoner."
"In what follows, I suggest that the truly odd legislative developments in the Ramadan case—the justice of exception we are witnessing at work, which will be addressed in the second half of this article—may be explained at least partially by the national (and to a lesser extent European) context in which they are occurring: a culture characterized by intense and pervasive Islamophobia in general (whose varied manifestations and links to France’s colonial history are beyond the scope of this piece) and more specifically, an already old French campaign to eliminate Ramadan from the intellectual, social, political and religious landscape of the nation."
"This article argues that Hasan’s narrative is not only an impetuous and intellectually dishonest account of a complicated history, but also conceptually flawed. By presenting Islamists as terrorist fanatics created by the very enemy they are fighting, Hasan effaces the crucial role of Islamists in the movement against Israeli colonization, and understates their popular support. Elementary knowledge of the history of the Palestinian cause and Islamism in the Middle East refutes these hasty claims."
"A specter is haunting South Asian diasporic youth—the specter of the Aunty. All the diasporic youth of South Asia have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter in order to disclose their own modern being. Reviled in her multiple forms, the Aunty is, as Maria Qamar argues, ‘a cross-cultural phenomenon that isn’t limited to a family member; she could be a neighbour, a family friend, or just some lady on the bus who wants to throw some casual black magic your way.’ Magical and entrancing, the Aunty can indeed be found everywhere, awaiting her coming exorcism."
Sayyid Qutb was amongst the avant-garde of the cadre of Muslim intellectuals who attempted to address the epistemological crisis. His work operates squarely under the assumption that the state of the Muslim umma is in desperate need of revival. He sought to address how this came to be and suggest ways to actualize an alternative future. Central to this project was his reconceptualization and rearticulation of the long-established term “jāhiliyya.” The following discussion will take Qutb’s conception of jāhiliyya as its point of departure in examining how he grappled with his perception of the larger epistemological crisis facing the Muslim world.
In this work, I argue that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the devastating civil war that followed was a period of history that defies encapsulation within binaries of “good” and “evil”. This work examines conflicting historical representations of Ahmad Shah Massoud and his role in these two destructive wars. It aims to demystify the image of a warlord.
Why should “they” hate “us”? The very question is on its face absurd, delusional, revealing of an aggregate detachment from reality so virulent in its evasiveness as to be deemed clinically pathological. Setting aside the wholly-contrived “confusion” professed in the aftermath as to who might be properly included under the headings “we” and “they,” the sole legitimate query that might have been posed on 9-1-1 was—and remains—“How could ‘they’ possibly not hate ‘us’?"
Through the use of memoirs and testimonies by Algerian militants and torture survivors, this paper argues that violence by French settlers and military personnel was not only a product of racial and economic power, but also, a result of secular doctrines, which recasted everyday Islamic practices of veiling, ritual purification, and other forms of worship as sites of antagonism.
In our so-called “post-ideological” world, even the most sincere observers have fallen trap to a myth perpetuated by the liberal order: that strategic political action or realpolitik transcends (or is devoid of) ideology. A case in point is the Tunisian Nahda movement’s decision to separate its political activities (primarily its political party) and its da’wah based activities. In 2016 the Nahda movement announced its shift from an “ideological movement engaged in the struggle for identity, to a protest movement against the authoritarian regime, and now to a national democratic party."
Using the Prophet’s mantle as a case study can shed light on the ways in which Islamic relic veneration encompasses a number of paradoxical relationships, namely the connection between the inaccessible and accessible. As an object at the crossroads of different disciplines and art forms, the Holy Mantle has a far-reaching impact that reveals much about the efficacy of such relics in reaching Muslims globally, especially when they have been translated across verbal channels.
In order to accomplish the mission of the “People’s War on Terror,” the Party Secretary of the university Zhou Xuyong declared that all “static” (zaoyin) and “noise” (zayin) would need to be eliminated. Anyone who demonstrated the slightest resonance with unapproved Islamic ideologies was to be purified through a process of “reverse osmosis” (fan shentou). He said the goal was to create an atmosphere in which Uyghur Islamic “extremists” scurried across the street like rats while the public surrounded them screaming their disapproval and beating them in righteous anger.
In the rest of this essay, we examine the consequences of the May 2013 massacre in Dhaka, Bangladesh. We collected written memories, reflections, poems, novellas, videos, other literary and non-literary artifacts in the aftermath of the massacre. These are some of the forms in which the massacre is memorialized within the Islamist counterpublic. These materials are the remaining traces — like dried blood — of the actual sets of events. It is a living archive that not only allows an immanent embodied critique of a secular society, but provides a marginal possibility for a realist speculation in retrospect.
Malcolm’s leave to the Hajj is vital. A series of circumstantial instances placed him within a worldly, proximal corporeality, a rich hapticality of the flesh, with an illuminated, emphatic sense of fungibility more external than what reciprocity could provide. Where reciprocity, the vehicle for recognition, is, to its own freely detestable demise, non-exchangeable, the one who lives for recognition nullifies, in the end, from the start, the capacity to attain a freedom independent of the body. He frequents the times he was met with unconditional hospitality and appreciation on behalf of Muslims across complexion and convention.
Syria's brutal repression of mass demonstrations across Syria in 2011 marked a decisive model of how authoritarian Arab regimes could avoid the fate of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt (and later, Gaddafi in Libya), who were seemingly swept away by popular revolutions, led by a coalition of leftist youth, liberal, constitutionalist reformers, and moderate, democratic Islamists, such as Ennadha and the Muslim Brothers. Bashar al-Assad and his 'Alawi generals and security officials were determined to eradicate the possibility of mass popular participation in political life, which would have made Baathist and 'Alawi control of the Syrian state and economy impossible.